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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2034
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SUBJECT: (SBU) REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON PRESIDENT
SARGSIAN'S INTENTIONS REGARDING NAGORNO-KARABAKH
(C-RE9-01646)

Classified By: MICHAEL P. OWENS, ACTING DIR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).

11. (S) WASHINGTON ANALYSTS ARE CLOSELY MONITORING THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN KEY ARMENIAN OFFICIALS AND THE DE FACTO GOVERNMENT OF NAGORNO-KARABAKH, AS WELL AS THE NEW ARMENIAN ADMINISTRATION, S POLICIES TOWARD THIS DISPUTE. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION--PARTICULARLY AS IT RELATES TO THE QUESTIONS BELOW--AS EMBASSY, S TIME AND RESOURCES PERMIT.

1A. (C) WHAT ARE PRESIDENT SERZH SARGSIAN'S EXPECTATIONS IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH AZERBAIJAN OVER NAGORNO-KARABAKH (N-K)? ON WHAT ISSUES IS SARGSIAN WILLING OR UNWILLING TO COMPROMISE? WHO IS ADVISING SARGSIAN ON N-K?

1B. (C) WHAT CONSTITUENCIES OR POWERFUL INDIVIDUALS MAY SARGSIAN HAVE TO CONSIDER WHEN DEVISING A SETTLEMENT? IF HE IS UNDER PRESSURE DOMESTICALLY, WHAT ARE ITS ORIGINS? WHO ARE THE ELITES, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE HIS ADMINISTRATION, THAT INFLUENCE SARGSIAN'S N-K POLICY, AND HOW?

1C. (C) WHAT DO ARMENIAN LEADERS ASSESS AZERIS WANT FROM N-K NEGOTIATIONS? DO THEY EXPECT CHANGE IN AZERI POSITIONS, AND IF SO, WHY? PLEASE CHARACTERIZE HOW ARMENIAN LEADERS ASSESS AZERBAIJAN'S NET STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES IN ITS NEGOTIATING POSITION ON N-K.

1D. (C) HOW DOES SARGSIAN VIEW THE MINSK GROUP PROCESS? HOW DOES HE ASSESS ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES?

1E. (C) DOES SARGSIAN RELY ON RUSSIA'S SUPPORT OF ARMENIA'S DIPLOMATIC POSITION IN THE MINSK GROUP? HOW DO ARMENIAN AND RUSSIAN OFFICIALS COORDINATE THEIR POSITIONS ON THE N-K CONFLICT. ON WHAT ISSUES DO THEY AGREE AND DISAGREE? TO WHAT EXTENT, IF ANY, IS RUSSIA PRESSURING ARMENIA TO MAKE A SETTLEMENT?

1F. (C) WHAT IS THE NATURE OF SARGSIAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DE FACTO GOVERNMENT OF NAGORNO-KARABAKH? DO N-K OFFICIALS DEPEND ON SARGSIAN FOR POLITICAL LEVERAGE? WHAT COMMON INTERESTS DO SARGSIAN AND THE N-K DE FACTO GOVERNMENT SHARE? WHERE DO THEIR INTERESTS DIVERGE?

1G. (C) HOW ARE VARIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUENCIES RESPONDING TO SARGSIAN'S NAGORNO-KARABAKH POLICIES AND WHICH, IF ANY, HAVE PLANS OR ABILITIES TO INFLUENCE DECISIONS LEGALLY OR EXTRA-LEGALLY?

1H. (C) ARE POLITICAL PARTIES (INCLUDING DASHNAKS, HERITAGE PARTY, OR THE ARMENIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS), ORGANIZATIONS, AND ELITE CLIQUES CHALLENGING SARGSIAN'S POLICIES TOWARD N-K? ARE THERE ANY INDICATIONS TRADITIONAL OPPOSITION PARTIES WILL BE ABLE TO OVERCOME PAST DIFFERENCES TO FORM A UNITED FRONT AGAINST SARGSIAN'S POLICIES? IS THE DASHNAK DECISION TO LEAVE THE COALITION A PERMANENT ONE? TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THEY STILL INTERACTING WITHIN THE GOVERNING COALITION ON SELECT ISSUES?

1I. (C) WHAT ARE FOREIGN MINISTER NALBANDIAN'S VIEWS ON THE BEST APPROACH TO NAGORNO-KARABAKH? HOW DOES HE VIEW HIS

AZERBAIJANI COUNTERPARTS, PARTICULARLY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMMADYAROV? HOW STABLE IS NALBANDIAN'S POSITION WITHIN GOVERNMENT? PLEASE CHARACTERIZE HIS RELATIONSHIPS WITH ELITES BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF THE GOVERNMENT.

¶J. (C) HOW MUCH POPULAR SUPPORT DO SARGSIAN'S N-K POLICIES ENJOY? DOES THE GOVERNMENT ATTEMPT TO ASSESS PUBLIC OPINION? WOULD POPULAR SUPPORT INCREASE IF SARGSIAN MOVED TO SETTLE N-K AND NORMALIZE TIES WITH TURKEY? OR WOULD IT REWARD AN EVEN TOUGHER/RISKIER POLICY STANCE? DOES THE GOVERNMENT HAVE ANY PLANS TO BEGIN PREPARING THE PUBLIC FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT ON N-K.

¶2. (U) PLEASE CITE C-RE9-01646 IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF REPORTING IN RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS.
CLINTON